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 1. Introduction 
In order to further improve both the efficiency of electricity markets 
and the reliability of electricity supply, the European Union wants to 
further integrate European electricity markets (European 
Commission, 2014). A crucial element in reaching this objective is 
extending the capacity of cross-border capacity between neighbouring 
markets. Currently the size of cross-border capacity compared to 
installed generation capacity is about 8% on average for EU countries, 
but the EU aims to raise this share to 15% by 2030. In the recent past 
a number of new interconnections have been build, and many more 
are likely to come.  
One of the plans for increasing interconnections is the AQUIND 
interconnector. The AQUIND Interconnector is a proposal by private 
investors to build and operate a new subsea and underground High 
Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) bi-directional connection of 2,000 
MW between the South Coast of England and Normandy in France. 
This project would raise the size of interconnection capacity from 
about 4% to 6% of total installed generation capacity in the UK; for 
France hold similar numbers.1  
This project has been designated as a Project of Common Interest 
(PCI) by the European Commission, which means that the project is 
viewed to be a key project towards the realisation of the targets 
regarding connecting European electricity markets. In addition, the 
UK government decided that the project is seen as a Nationally 
Significant Infrastructure Project. 2 
                                                          




2 See http://aquind.co.uk/. 
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The interconnection is primarily meant for commercial trade 
based on price differences between the UK and French power market, 
but it can also be used for system support to the transmission 
networks in both countries by providing rapid voltage and frequency 
support during system disturbances.  
The private investors of AQUIND requested the regulatory 
authorities in UK (Ofgem) and France (CRE) for exemption of 
regulation in May 2017, which means (among others) that they ask for 
permission not to use the revenues resulting from the allocation of the 
interconnection (solely) for maintaining or increasing the 
interconnection capacity and guaranteeing its actual availability.3 
These regulators referred this request to the European energy 
regulator (ACER) in December 2017. In June 2018, ACER decided 
negatively on this request, implying that the AQUIND interconnection 
should be built and operated subject to a regulatory regime.4 In its 
appeal to this decision, the investors state that a merchant investor 
faces higher risks than an incumbent investor but that these risks are 
not adequately compensated  under a regulatory regime.5 As a 
consequence, the merchant investor would not be able to finance the 
investment by acquiring equity and debt capital needed. 
In this policy paper I reflect on the question to what extent a 
merchant investor is restricted in its abilities to finance an 
                                                          
3 EU Regulation on conditions for access to the network for cross-border 









       
 
interconnector due to the constraints of a regulatory regime.6 One of 
the key elements to be discussed is the actual costs of capital of a 
merchant investor in relation to the compensation offered for these 
costs by the regulatory regime. Before going into this topic, first the 





                                                          
6 This note is based on a review of recent economic literature and information 
provided in public sources. 
6 
       
  
7 
       
 
2. Regulated versus merchant investments 
Building (new) interconnection capacity between two power markets 
may result in lower overall costs of generation as it enables low-cost 
producers to export power to the neighbouring market where the 
system marginal costs (and price) are higher. This is a major source of 
the potential welfare contribution of interconnectors (Dutton et al., 
2017). In addition, reducing barriers between markets may result in 
fiercer competition because of the increase in number of suppliers 
while it may also result in higher reliability because of the higher 
availability of flexibility options to deal with variations in supply and 
demand. 
The highest welfare improvement is realised when the 
investment is done by a public investor who maximizes social welfare 
(Sereno, et al., 2018). In theory, the welfare-maximizing design of an 
investment is where the marginal social benefits equal the marginal 
social costs of the investment. There are, however several factors 
which may make that the incumbent investors (TSOs7) are not able to 
realize this point of investing in interconnections. These investors do 
not always have the incentives to make these investments (for 
instance, because of lack of unbundling with commercial activities in 
generation), regulators may not be able to commit to a long-term 
policy regarding allowed revenues, while there may also be 
coordination problems between the regulators of the markets on both 
sides of the interconnection (Rubino, et al., 2015; Dutton et al., 2017; 
Gerbaulet et al., 2018). Therefore, merchant investors may be an 
alternative to realize more, welfare-improving interconnections. 
The major difference between a merchant investment and a 
similar investment done by an incumbent utility, is that the objective 
                                                          
7 Transmission System Operators. 
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is to maximize the congestion profits resulting from using the line. As 
a result, a merchant investor does not want to remove all congestion 
as then the price differences between the two markets will vanish, and 
hence, no congestion rents can be earned anymore. Consequently, 
merchant investors have an incentive to invest less than what would 
be socially optimal (Blumsack et al., 2008; Sereno et al., 2018). 
Nevertheless, the merchant interconnections may create significant 
welfare effects. Gerbaulet et al. (2018) find that the welfare gain 
realised by merchant projects is about 70% of the maximum 
achievable welfare, while Doucet et al. (2013) also conclude that 
market forces may be able to provide the appropriate incentives for 
investments in transmission capacity. 
Besides investing less than the socially optimal level, merchant 
investors may also have an incentive to depart from the optimal 
design of the investment as they maximize their private profits 
coming from congesting revenues instead of the benefits for the full 
network, including effects on reliability (Lamadrid et al., 2016; 
Gerbaulet et al., 2018). Indirect effects of a particular interconnection 
on the availability of capacity in other parts of the network, resulting 
from the physical (Kirchoff’s) laws, may be neglected, just as the 
impact on reliability of the grid (Blumsack, et al., 2008). 
In addition, merchant investments in interconnections may 
result in an uneven distribution of welfare resulting from the 
interconnection, i.e. merchant investors may acquire a major part of 
the welfare improvement of the interconnector if no additional 
(regulatory) conditions would be imposed on the merchant 
investment. Merchant investors sell the interconnection capacity to 
traders (or players in the electricity market); the maximum price 
these traders are prepared to pay is (theoretically) determined by the 
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(expected) differences in prices between both markets. The more the 
merchant investor is able to charge a fee for using the line which is 
close to this willingness-to-pay, the more the welfare improvement 
resulting from the interconnector is realised by the merchant 
investor. This is the fundamental economic effect that the owner of 
the scarce resource gets the scarcity rent, the so-called Ricardian rent.  
This distributional effect of the welfare of an interconnection can 
be formulated in terms of the micro-economic concepts of consumer 
surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS) and the surplus for the scarce 
resource, in this case the interconnection (IS). These economic 
concepts are, however, not really useful for policy discussions in 
practice. The concepts CS, PS and IS are theoretical concepts, not 
saying much about which groups in society are receiving which part of 
the improvement in welfare. The CS refer to the surplus realised by all 
users of the commodity, which means in the case of energy that the 
‘consumers’ mainly consist of large energy-intensive industries, 
possibly partly owned by a group of international investors. For PS 
holds more or less the same: the ‘producers’ are everyone who 
produces electricity, so including residential prosumers and small-
scale wind parks. The IS can be acquired by a commercial investor, 
but this player can be a company as any other.  
Hence, the conclusion of, for instance, Gerbaulet et al. (2018) 
that because of the fact the “merchant takes it all” having no 
interconnector is equal to having a merchant investment, is simply 
not correct. Such a conclusion is based on translating theoretical 
economic concepts as CS, PS and IS to the decision making in practice 
without paying attention to the players (firms, people) who are 
playing the role of consumer, producer and network operator. A 
merchant investment that generates a positive overall welfare is 
10 
       
always beneficial for society, even if the merchant investor acquires 




       
 
3. Risks and returns of a merchant investment under  
     regulation 
 
The revenues of a merchant investment in interconnection in an 
unregulated environment is determined by the market value of that 
interconnection, which depends on the expected differences in power 
prices between the two markets. The higher the (expected) price 
differences, the more traders are prepared to pay for getting access to 
the interconnection and the more they want to utilize the line. In a 
regulated environment, however, the revenues do not depend on price 
differences, but on the maximum tariffs set by the regulator(s) and 
the utilisation of the line. The key difference between regulated and 
unregulated situation is the level and certainty about the future prices 
and tariffs.  
In principle tariff regulation imposed by regulators on network 
operators is basically meant to protect consumers (network users) 
from excessive (monopoly) tariffs while also giving incentives to the 
operator to operate as efficiently as possible. One condition for setting 
the level of tariffs is that these should be able to give sufficient 
compensation for both the operational and capital costs. The central 
parameter in the determination of the compensation for the capital 
costs is the WACC8. This parameter is the estimate by the regulator of 
the costs of using capital, both debt and equity. For both the cost of 
debt and the required return on equity, the risks for the investors 
have to be assessed.  
The risks for the providers of debt are translated into the so-
called debt premium: the extra compensation above the risk-free 
interest rate which is needed to compensate providers of debt for the 
                                                          
8 Weigthed Average Costs of Capital. 
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extra risks incurred when they provide debt capital to the project. 
This risk is related to the ability of the company to pay the regular 
interests and to repay the debt. The level of the risk premium depends 
not only on the characteristics of an investment project, but also on 
the financial strength and the type of ownership of the company. If a 
regulator bases the risk premium on the financial rating of companies 
which are state owned and mainly active in regulated business, this 
premium may be too low for a company which faces a higher financial 
risk purely because of its type of ownership and character of 
(revenues from) other activities. 
The risks for the providers of equity are translated into the so-
called equity premium, which is the compensation required by 
investors as compensation for the non-diversifiable (or: systematic) 
risk. This premium depends on two parameters: the market-risk 
premium, which is the premium required by investors for investing in 
the (perfectly diversified) market portfolio, and the equity beta, which 
describes to what extend the risk of a specific project is related to the 
systematic, market risk.  
The market-risk premium is completely independent of the 
characteristics of individual projects, so it does not matter whether a 
project is conducted by a TSO or a private-equity investor, the 
market-risk premium remains the same. The equity beta, however, is 
to some extent related to the characteristics of the investor. The 
equity beta depends on the asset beta, which describes how the risk of 
a project is related to the market risk, and the gearing, which is the 
ratio debt/equity in the project.  
A merchant investor may face higher risks because it may be less 
well equipped to minimize the risks caused by general economic 
circumstances (i.e. the market risk) than a TSO operating the full 
13 
       
 
electricity grid. In addition, a merchant investor may be less able to 
attract debt than a TSO operating in a regulated environment and 
backed by the state as owner, which implies that the share of equity is 
higher (i.e. gearing is lower). A lower gearing implies that the asset 
risk is allocated over a higher amount of equity, which lowers the 
equity beta. It is an empirical matter which of the two effects 
dominates: the higher asset beta, raising the costs of equity, or the 
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4. Conclusion on AQUIND case 
 
The AQUIND Interconnector has already been defined as a EU 
project of common interest (PCI) and a UK Nationally Significant 
Infrastructure project. Hence, one may conclude that the concerns 
resulting from the findings in economic literature that merchant lines 
may result in suboptimal or ill-designed interconnections, have been 
carefully addressed in this investment project. The project is seen as 
beneficial both for the UK and the European integrated electricity 
market.9 The remaining issue is whether the operation of this line 
should be made subject to regulation and if so, which regulatory 
adaptations should be done, if any, to take into account the special 
characteristics of a merchant investor.  
Whether or not to regulate an interconnector depends on a 
number of conditions10, but the main issue of discussion refers to the 
risk incurred by the investor in relation to the compensation offered 
by the regulatory regime. The investment in the AQUIND 
interconnector is, without any doubt, a high-risk investment. The 
project is an irreversible long-term investment, where the revenues 
are highly uncertain. The future utilisation, i.e. the future exchange of 
electricity between UK and France, depends on developments in 
global energy markets (affecting fuel prices and, hence, system 
marginal costs of generation), domestic and European energy policies 
(e.g. regarding promoting renewable energy, closing and building new 
generation capacity (nuclear, coal)) as well as other investments in 
                                                          
9 In its decision on the exemption request by AQUIND, ACER concludes that 
the interconnector investment is beneficial from a European energy-system 
wide perspective. See Section 6.4.8 in 
https://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Indivi
dual%20decisions/ACER%20Decision%2005-2018%20on%20AQUIND.pdf 
10 Regulation EC 714/2009, Article 17(1). 
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interconnection (which will come given the EU ambition to raise the 
size of interconnection capacity to 15% of installed generation 
capacity).  
Participating in such a risky project requires an expected return 
on investment which is significantly above the return in many other 
(regulated) projects. In principle, a regulatory framework should be 
able to provide the outlook on such a higher return, but in practice it 
might be complicated for the regulator to commit to either higher 
WACC’s or to allow higher revenues. In any way, special 
arrangements within the regulatory framework are required to 
compensate for the relatively high risks of the interconnector 
(Poudineh et al., 2017). These arrangements need to be implemented 
independently on the type of company that is making the investment, 
TSO or merchant, purely based on the characteristics of the project.  
In addition, a special arrangement in the regulatory treatments 
seems also to be needed if the investor is a non-TSO company, 
because of the different abilities to attract debt and equity compared 
to a TSO. These differences are related to a number of elements in the 
WACC. The required debt premium may be higher resulting from the 
fact that the investor may have a less strong financial rating than a 
state-owned network operator mainly operating in regulated 
business, the asset beta of an interconnector project operated by a 
non-TSO may be higher because of the possibly fewer number of 
options to minimize the risks than a TSO has, while the equity beta 
may be lower because of the lower gearing. In addition, the regulation 
may in itself create more risks for a non-TSO if it caps the revenues 
without giving the option to recover financial losses via raising 
revenues for other activities, as a TSO may be able to do (Rubino, et 
al., 2015). 
17 
       
 
If such arrangements in the regulatory treatment cannot be 
implemented with any certainty, the regulatory option may be less 
attractive making it non-viable, i.e. less effective as the risk would be 
too great for investors, than giving exemption of regulation to the 
merchant investor. This exemption may be subject to a number of 
conditions, as was also proposed by AQUIND in its exemption 
application11, such as on the duration of the exemption, the maximum 
size of the revenues or the minimum capacity to be offered in a non-
discriminating manner (Dutton, et al., 2017). Implementing such 
conditions may prevent that the merchant investor takes all the 
welfare benefits, which is a concern mentioned by a.o. Gerbaulet et al. 
(2018), without removing the incentives for realising the investment. 
The recent examples with the introduction of the cap-and-floor 
regimes for merchant interconnections show that hybrid forms of 
regulated and merchant lines can be effective solutions to realize 
more interconnection capacity by taking into account the 
requirements of both investors and network users (Strbac et al., 2014; 
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